Persons, Property, and the Corporation: A Proposal for a New Paradigm by Nesteruk, Jeffrey
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 39 
Issue 3 Spring 1990 Article 3 
Persons, Property, and the Corporation: A Proposal for a New 
Paradigm 
Jeffrey Nesteruk 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Jeffrey Nesteruk, Persons, Property, and the Corporation: A Proposal for a New Paradigm, 39 DePaul L. 
Rev. 543 (1990) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol39/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
PERSONS, PROPERTY, AND THE CORPORATION:
A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW PARADIGM
Jeffrey Nesteruk*
INTRODUCTION
Fundamental to our legal system is the distinction between "persons" and
"property." The distinction, roughly put, is one between that which "acts"
and that which is "acted upon." The essentially active nature of the person
is evident from the law's conception of the person as the subject of rights
and duties.1 Rights and duties, after all, imply an active subject, one who
may exercise privileges and fulfill obligations. Similarly, the notion of property2
as an entity "acted upon" or essentially passive is also readily apparent.
Central to the law's definition of property is its susceptibility to ownership.
The traditional notion of ownership entails control.3 As a controlled entity,
property is acted upon by those who exercise control, i.e., its owners. 4
The large, modern corporation5 does not fit neatly into this conceptual
scheme. 6 This is because the person/property dichotomy offers no conceptual
framework for understanding property which has been artificially activated,
that is, has become an actor. But that is precisely what occurs through the
legal mechanism of incorporation. The corporation retains its status as
* Assistant Professor of Business, Law & Public Policy, Michigan State University.
1. "Duties and rights belong to persons. Persons are the subjects of rights and duties:
and, as the subject of a right; a person is the object of the correlative duty, and conversely."
P. POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 113 (6th ed. 1929).2. By the term "property," I mean more precisely "things" or the subject of property.
In law, "property" is not a "thing" although "things" are the subject of property. R.
CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 1 (1984).
3. See P. POLLOCK, supra note 1, at 179 (describing ownership as the entirety of the powers
of use and disposal afforded by law).
4. Thus, we commonly speak of the rights and duties which persons have regarding things.
See, e.g., Honore, Ownership, in PROPERTY: CASES, CONCEPTS, CRITIQUES 78 (L. Becker & K.
Kipnis eds. 1984) (describing the standard incidents of ownership as those legal rights, duties
and other incidents which apply to the person who has the greatest interest in a thing). For a
discussion of the appropriate constitutional analysis of property rights, see Baker, Property
and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1986) (discussing
government regulation and constitutional protection of property rights, as well as the functions
of property).
5. One difficulty in analyzing the nature of the corporation is the wide variety of enterprises
and activities which operate under the corporate form. The focus here will be only on large,
publicly-held, for-profit corporations.
6. For the historical background of the modern corporation, see Hovenkamp, The Classical
Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593 (1988).
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property, is owned by the shareholders, and in theory is controlled by its
owners. 7 However, the corporation also has an independent legal existence
which permits it to act in many significant ways, such as entering into
contracts, suing those who have wronged it, and even exercising its free
speech rights in political referenda.'
7. There is, of course, a wide divergence between this theory of the corporation and the
realities of the modern corporate world. Indeed, the shareholder's loss of significant aspects of
control over the corporation is an important part of the argument advanced by this article. See
infra text accompanying notes 61-80. The focus of my analysis is on individual shareholders
rather than institutional holders of stock.
8. A landmark decision regarding corporate first amendment rights is First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). In Bellotti, the Supreme Court considered the issue of
legislative restrictions on corporate speech. The Court found that corporations have protectable
first amendment rights, particularly when the speech at issue concerned a matter of public
concern. Id. at 776-77. The Court also rejected the argument that the first amendment protects
corporate speech only if the subject of that speech is the corporation's business. Id. at 777.
Because of its importance, the decision has attracted a large amount of commentary. See, e.g.,
Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish's The Value of
Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646 (1982) (stating that Bellotti undermines individuals' ability
to control their own destinies); Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under
the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981) (questioning the idea of corporate first amend-
ment rights and discussing those rights in connection with individual shareholder rights); Hatano,
Should Corporations Exercise Their Freedom of Speech Rights?, 22 Am. Bus. L.J. 165 (1984)
(proposing a framework to guide corporations in exercising free speech rights); O'Kelley, The
Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Cor-
poration after First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347 (1979) (arguing that the
Bellotti Court employed incorrect reasoning and proposing the Field and associational ration-
ales); Patton & Bartlett, Corporate "Persons" and Freedom of Speech: The Political Impact
of Legal Mythology, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 494 (the Supreme Court failed to recognize that when
the state supports corporate speech, the state itself gains political power); Prentice, Consolidated
Edison and Bellotti: First Amendment Protection of Corporate Political Speech, 16 TULSA L.J.
599 (1981) (extension of free speech rights to corporations is beneficial; commentators speculating
on the negative impact of Bellotti are overreacting); Schneider, Free Speech and Corporate
Freedom: A Comment on First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1227
(1986) (analysis of the Bellotti Court's reasoning and first amendment rights in general); Shaw,
Corporate Speech in the Marketplace of Ideas, 7 J. CORP. L. 265 (1982) (Bellotti and similar
cases threaten legislation designed to prevent the abuse of corporate political influence); Shaw,
Hurd & Bader, Corporate Political Speech and the First Amendment, 9 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV.
271 (1984) (discussing corporate rights and the effect of corporate free speech on individual
rights); Note, Corporate Speech on Political Issues: The First Amendment in Conflict with
Democratic Ideals?, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 445 (analysis of theories behind protecting or limiting
corporate speech).
I have previously sought to show how Bellotti implicates the fundamental question of the
nature of the corporate person. See Nesteruk, Bellotti and the Question of Corporate Moral
Agency, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 683, 701 (reasoning that because an individual's speech is
premised on the fact that the individual is a moral agent, it is distinguishable from corporate
speech, which does not involve the same moral issue). For further discussions of Bellotti in the
context of developing a theory of the nature of the corporate person, see M. DAN-COHEN,
RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 102-13
(1986); Note, Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, 91 YALE L.J. 1641 (1982) (dis-
cussing Bellotti in the context of general corporate rights and attributes) [hereinafter Note,
Constitutional Rights].
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The anomalous nature of the corporation has given rise to much reflection
and debate within legal circles. Central to such reflection and debate is the
question: Is the corporation a person?9 The response to this question has
ranged from terse judicial attempts to assume away the problem, to extended
philosophical debate regarding the nature of a person.' 0
A classic example of the judicial response can be found in Santa Clara
Co. v. Southern Pacific Railroad." Faced with the question of whether a
corporation is a person under the fourteenth amendment, Chief Justice Waite
made the now famous pronouncement:
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether
the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We
are all of the opinion that it does.' 2
Philosophers, on the other hand, have recently debated'3 in extensive
fashion the personhood status of the corporation through an exploration of
the issue of corporate moral agency.14 In particular, philosopher Peter French
has asserted that corporations should be accorded the same status as natural
persons. French has theorized that moral persons are those that are subject
9. For a classic work on this question, see A. NEKAM, THE PERSONALITY CONCEPTION OF
THE LEGAL ENTITY (1938).
10. For an account of the history of the personification of the American business corpo-
ration, see Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987).
11. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
12. Id. at 396.
13. The philosophic debate is an ongoing and lively one. See, e.g., T. DONALDSON, COR-
PORATIONS AND MORALITY (1982) (analyzing proposals for corporate reform, including corporate
democracy, internal legislation, and increased stockholder control); P. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE
AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1984) (defining the corporation as a moral person and devel-
oping principles of extended accountability of the corporation); Donaldson, Personalizing
Corporate Ontology: The French Way, in SHAME, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE CORPORATION 101
(H. Curtler ed. 1986) (discussing one author's inability to conceptualize the status of corporations
and human beings); Goodpaster, The Concept of Corporate Responsibility, in JUST BUSINESS
306 (T. Regan ed. 1983) (arguing that society should expect the same moral attributes in
organizations as it does individuals); Ladd, Persons and Responsibility: Ethical Concepts and
Impertinent Analogies, in SHL4,i, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE CORPORATION (H. Curtler ed. 1986);
French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PI. Q. 207, 210 (1979) (characterizing
moral persons, including corporations, as the referents of responsibility ascriptions); Ladd,
Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal Organizations, 54 THE MONIST 488 (1970)
(exploring the moral implications of the use of rationality in decisionmaking of formal organ-
izations with regards to individuals).
14. The issue of corporate moral agency presents the question of whether the corporation
is an entity capable of making moral choices, of choosing this action as right and that action
as wrong. I have revealed in an earlier article the connections between the issue of corporate
moral agency and the corporate social responsibility debate. See Nesteruk, Corporations,
Shareholders, and Moral Choice: A New Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility 58 U.
CIN. L. REV. 451 (1990).
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to a moral responsibility, which includes the concepts of accountability and
intentional action. 5 Since corporations manifest their intentions through
their internal decisionmaking structures, French asserts that corporations
should be held to the same moral standards as natural persons.
6
What is absent from the debate over whether the corporation is a person 7
is a reexamination of the very question itself. Therefore, I wish to take issue
with that question in this Article. 0 Inquiring as to whether or not a cor-
poration is a person is an inadequate way of determining the law's approach
to corporations.19 The question contains hidden implications and assumptions
which significantly hinder the law's development in the corporate area.20 I
contend that we should think less about whether or not the corporation is
a person,2" and more about what it is that we want the corporation to be.
This Article begins with the proposition that the law's recognition of the
corporation as a person is not a simple descriptive statement but a normative
premise. 22 As such, it implies norms or standards regarding both the cor-
poration's internal decisionmaking process and its proper relationship to the
external community. In regard to the internal decisionmaking of the cor-
poration, corporate personhood fosters the development of a particular
decisionmaking structure, which is marked by an expansion of managerial
discretion and a contraction of shareholder powers. 3 Beyond this impact
upon the corporation's internal dynamics, the law's view of the corporation
as a person tends to restrict our analytic framework for considering the
corporation's relation to external groups. In particular, such a view dis-
courages us from thinking of the corporation as an entity to which are
ascribed duties, but not rights.24
15. P. FRENCH, supra note 13, at 38. French has stated that he hoped "to provide the
foundation of a theory that allows treatment of corporations as full fledged members of the
moral community, of equal standing with the traditionally acknowledged residents: human
beings." Id. at 32.
16. Id. at 39.
17. For a multidisciplinary examination of the corporation including the question of cor-
porate personhood, see CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY (W. Samuels
& A. Miller eds. 1987) [hereinafter CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY].
18. "Better answers often await better questions." Coffee, Regulating the Market for
Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1146 (1984).
19. A classic writer on the subject notes the word "person" must be used carefully, since,
from a scientific point of view, it has several meanings and is associated with several emotional
associations. See A. NEKAM, supra note 9, at 37.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 35-98 (discussing the elements of corporate person-
hood).
21. For a linguistic analysis of the law's characterization of the corporation as a person,
see Shane, The Corporation is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REV.
563, 592-609 (1987).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 27-34.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 35-80.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 81-98.
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A new paradigm is needed for thinking about the corporation, one which
transcends the person/property dichotomy of the present law. I propose a
basic tripartite structure: person, property, and organization,25 which will
benefit the development of corporate law and policy.
The specific advantages of this new legal framework derive from its greater
descriptive accuracy and new normative orientation.2 6 The legal notions of
both "person" and "property" simply fail to adequately describe the reality
of today's corporation. The greater descriptive accuracy of the proposed
paradigm brings squarely into view what has been obscured by the present
law: the phenomenon of corporate power. Beyond its greater descriptive
accuracy, this new legal framework adopts an equally new normative posi-
tion. This new orientation will not permit the norms, values, and assumptions
relating to individuals to be unthinkingly transferred to the analysis of the
corporation.
I. DESCRIPTIVE STATEMENT VERSUS NORMATIVE PREMISE
The fact that the corporation does not fit neatly into the category of either
person or property is significant. It indicates that the law's recognition of
the corporation as a person27 involves more than a descriptive statement.
Corporations share qualities both of the traditional model for the legal
person-a human being-and of property. Within this legal framework,
simple descriptions cannot resolve the question of the corporation's status.
The law's recognition of the corporation as a person does more than
merely describe the phenomenon; it implies norms and articulates standards. 28
Affirmation of corporate personhood is a descriptive matter only in a limited,
superficial sense. 29 More fundamentally, it is a linguistic means of establishing
normative premises. These premises provide a basis for legal reasoning and
choice, and subsequently affect normative reformation of the economy.30
The normative import of denominating the corporate entity as a person
is not by itself surprising. Indeed, normative considerations come into play
when the law declines to grant to certain categories of human beings the
status of person. For certain purposes, some human beings such as minors
and the mentally incompetent are not considered to be persons under the
law.3
25. See infra text accompanying notes 99-108.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 109-36.
27. For a brief survey of when the law regards the corporation as a person and when it
declines to make this characterization, see H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS
AND OTHER BUSINEss ENTERPRISES 149-52 (1983).
28. For a work which emphasizes the normative implications of organizational theories, see
M. KEELEY, A SOCIAL-CONTRACT THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONS (1988).
29. Samuels, The Idea of the Corporation as a Person: On the Normative Significance of
Judicial Language, in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY, supra note 17, at 127.
30. Id.
31. James Coleman notes that even a "natural person" is a legal construct. Natural persons
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What is important, however, is to recognize the consequences of adopting
the notion of corporate personhood as a normative premise.3 2 Corporate
personhood implies certain standards regarding: (1) the internal dynamics of
the corporate decisionmaking process;3 3 and, (2) the corporation's proper
relationship to its external community. 4 These two issues will be considered
in turn.
A. The Corporation's Internal Decisionmaking Process
Adopting corporate personhood as a normative premise has implications
for the nature of the corporation's decisionmaking process." For example,
the law's adoption of this premise has fostered the development of a partic-
ular corporate decisionmaking structure,36 one which is marked by an ex-
pansion of managerial 7 discretion and a contraction of shareholder powers.3"
are not by definition all physical individuals. A natural person is one who has certain rights
and responsibilities. Some individuals, however, such as minors and the mentally incompetent
are not natural persons in the legal sense because they are not afforded certain rights and
responsibilities. J. COLEMAN, POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY 14 n.I (1974).
32. For an argument that different conceptions of the corporate person in specific historical
contexts are not infinitely manipulatable but have particular effects on concrete developments
of legal doctrine, see Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory
in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY, supra note 17, at 13-63.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 35-80.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 81-98.
35. Warren Samuels remarks, "Any answer to the question, What is the corporation? is
itself functional in the evolution of the corporation. Thus answers are attractive and contrived
because of their anticipated or desired consequences in that evolution." Samuels, supra note
29, at 115.
36. What should be emphasized from the start is that the argument which follows does not
entail any exclusive causal claims. A number of factors, including economic conditions and
considerations, have contributed and are contributing to the particular decisionmaking structure
which has prevalence today. What I hope to show is simply the important conceptual connections
which exist between the image of the corporate entity as a person and a certain relationship
between management and shareholders.
37. Throughout this Article, references to management are meant to refer broadly to both
corporate directors and corporate officers. For a work which argues that there has been a
major shift in power specifically to corporate directors, see A. FLEISCHER, G. HAZARD & M.
KLIPPER, BOARD GAMES: THE CHANGING SHAPE OF CORPORATE POWER (1988).
38. James Coleman described the increase in managerial control as an increase in the ability
of the holders of usage rights and resources, the managers, to utilize these resources. The usage
leads to ends which do not match the goals of the nominal owner of these rights, the
shareholders. Because of their increased power as corporate actors, the managers and directors
can act in a manner freed from the constraints placed by natural persons. J. COLEMAN, THE
ASYMMETRIC SOCIETY 63 (1982).
An important countervailing trend which constrains corporate management is the increasingly
active posture of institutional shareholders. For a description and analysis of the trend, see
Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7-
9 (1987). While the ultimate significance of this trend may as yet be difficult to discern, it is
important to note the nature of its effect upon management. For example, management is
becoming increasingly distanced from that rich and wide-ranging spectrum of desires, norms,
and perspectives which characterize the moral choices of individual shareholders in their everyday
lives. It is being constrained by such human choices filtered through the narrow and formalized
role of the investor in which the goal of profit predominates. Nesteruk, supra note 8, at 698.
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1. The Corporation Versus the Natural Person
In order to reveal how viewing the corporate entity as a person promotes
a certain relationship between management and shareholders, it is necessary
to emphasize two ways in which the corporation differs from natural persons.
This is because the development of the particular decisionmaking structure
dominant in large, modern corporations has its roots in the manner in which
the evolution of the corporation has served to compensate for these two
differences.39 The movement is toward a corporate form which more nearly
approximates the character of the natural person.4
The first fundamental way in which the corporation differs from the
individual lies in the fact that the corporation can only act through agents.
41
While natural persons can act without the mediation of another, the cor-
poration always requires the efforts of its employees and others in order to
perform its actions. Strictly speaking, for example, it is the corporation's
president, not the corporation itself, who signs the bank loan papers needed
to provide corporate funds. 42
The second major way in which the corporate entity and natural person
differ relates to our notion of ownership 3. 4  Within our legal order, corpo-
39. Such a pattern of development lends support to the view that social and economic
developments are at least in part a function of the pool of concepts or images available to a
society. "The power of organizations to survive in a society," writes Kenneth Boulding,
"depends largely upon the nature of the stock of images of that society. The General Motors
Corporation, for instance, would be quite inconceivable in ancient Rome because the Romans
did not possess the requisite set of images." K. BoULDING, THE IMsAGE 57 (1956).
40. For an analysis of how the concept of corporate social responsibility causes the cor-
poration to more nearly resemble a natural person, see Nesteruk, supra note 14, at 455-56.
Even those who attack the notion of corporate social responsibility appear to acknowledge
the connections between such a notion and the more fundamental question of corporate
personhood. Daniel Fischel, for example, discusses the moral aspects of corporate responsibility
in the context of managers' duties. He discounts the notion that a corporation can have moral
obligations, because the corporation is not a person, and is instead more similar to an inanimate
object. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1273 (1982).
Fischel goes on to say that corporate responsibility should be analyzed in terms of contract
law, as opposed to public policy. Id.
41. See, e.g., May, Vicarious Agency and Corporate Responsibility, 43 PHIL. STUD. 69, 70
(1983) (since corporations can only act vicariously, they should be given a unique status as
agents); Velasquez, Why Corporations are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do, 2
Bus. & PROF. ETHICS J. 1, 7 (1983) (in corporate agency, human beings are the direct actors,
but their acts are attributed to the corporation as its own).
42. The fact that corporations can only act through agents has been a part of the debate
over the nature of the corporate entity. For an illustration of how it can be a crucial part of
a proposal for a new model of the corporation, see Note, Constitutional Rights, supra note 8,
at 1652-58.
43. For general discussions of our ideas of property and ownership as well as alternative
perspectives, see, e.g., Burns, Blackstone's Theory of the "Absolute" Rights of Property, 54
U. CIN. L. REV. 67 (1985) (discussing Blackstone's theories on the law of nature and property
rights); Butler, Marxian Concepts of Ownership in Soviet Law, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
281 (1985) (discussing ownership issues in socialist countries); Cribbet, Concepts in Transition:
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rations may be owned but individuals may not." Ownership, as we have
traditionally conceived it, is incompatible with the dignity and status of
natural persons. 45 Indeed, slavery or the ownership of one person by another
was at the center of the Civil War. In contrast, throughout the corporation's
modern development, its ownership by shareholders has been a widely ac-
cepted aspect of its structure.
2. The Theoretical Model of the Corporation
This awareness of the two ways in which corporations differ from indi-
viduals must be joined with an understanding of the theoretical model of
the corporation. 46 Conceptually, there is a key difference between manage-
ment and shareholders when it comes to the issue of control. The shareholders
are the owners and controllers of the corporation. 4 They therefore, in theory,
retain their autonomy. Management, however, again from a theoretical
perspective, lacks this autonomy. Managers are fiduciaries and employees of
the corporation and as such should serve its purposes. 41
This key conceptual difference between management and shareholders has
significance for the law's recognition of the corporation as a person. With
The Search for a New Definition of Property, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. I (discussing twentieth
century developments in property law); Rose, Possession as the Origin of Ownership, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985) (discussing concepts of possession and ownership); Sax, Some Thoughts
on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REV. 481 (1983) (discussing governmental
limitations on development).
44. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
45. This widely-held assumption is worthy of philosophic reflection. What precisely is the
origin of this intuitive incompatibility? Implicit in the discussion which follows is the notion
that the core of this incompatibility is the way in which our traditional conception of ownership
entails control. See infra text accompanying notes 61-80. Such external control is inconsistent
with the kind of autonomy appropriate to a human being. An interesting and important question
is whether this autonomy is now being threatened by institutions other than slavery. See infra
text accompanying notes 109-23. If so, we must consider whether our philosophic and legal
analysis of slavery may be applied to these new forms of control.
46. There are, of course, significant variances between this model and actual corporate
practices. But it is necessary to acknowledge this model in order to understand the interaction
between a theoretical position such as corporate personhood and the practical development of
the corporation.
47. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 27, at 550-51 (the shareholders elect officers
and directors who manage the corporation).
48. Harry Henn and John Alexander provide a good summary of management's position
in this connection. In discussing the board of directors, they point out that although the
shareholders elect and remove the directors, the directors are not the agents of the shareholders.
Furthermore, the position of director is distinguishable from that of trustee. Their position is
sui generis. Directors have a duty to the corporation; in a sense, they are fiduciaries. Id. at
563. While the position of corporate officers varies from that of board members, such officers
are also fiduciaries of the corporation. In contrast, officers, as regards to their power to bind
the corporation, are agents of the corporation. They are thus subject to the fiduciary duties
found in agency law. Id. at 586.
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regard to shareholders, the notion of corporate personhood requires a re-
consideration of the shareholder's status as owner. Because ownership is
incompatible with the dignity and status of persons, shareholder ownership
must be redefined in such a way as to be consistent with the status of the
corporation as a person. As will be shown below, this has occurred through
an alteration of the extent and character of shareholder control. 49 Essentially,
the shareholder's powers are contracted.
The concept of corporate personhood entails something quite different in
connection with the role of management. Unlike individuals, corporations
can act only through agents. Thus, in order to approximate the free volition
of an individual, the corporation requires agents entrusted with a broad
range of discretion. In the actual development of the corporation described
below, this has meant a change in the nature of managerial choice. 0 The
core of this change is a broadening of management's discretion.
B. Some Key Developments in Shareholder and Management Roles
The broadening of management's discretion and the contraction of share-
holder powers may be seen by reviewing aspects of the historical development
of the corporation. What follows are some selected legal developments which
characterize the modern shareholder/management relationship." These de-
velopments demonstrate how the corporation has moved towards a form
which more nearly approximates the nature and status of a natural person. 2
With regard to management's role, there has been an increase in manage-
ment's control of the corporation." This increase in managerial autonomy
allows the corporation a range of choice analogous to the free will of an
individual.
Two significant developments in modern corporate law mark the increase
in management's control. First, the nature of the restriction on management's
decisionmaking has shifted. The law has moved from a rigid "ultra vires"
49. See infra text accompanying notes 62-80.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 51-58.
51. A discussion of the historical development of the legal roles of management and
shareholders may be found in J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 85-111 (1970).
52. A similar discussion of the broadening of management's discretion may be found in
Nesteruk, supra note 8, at 692-93.
53. See, e.g., Mason, The Apologetics of Managerialism, 31 J. Bus. 1 (1958). The author
explains that control of the corporation has moved out of the hands of the owners. Several
attributes mark corporate management: high specialization, competence in the field, and mo-
tivations which are substantially different from those of the owner-capitalist. In addition, the
area of discretionary function and limitations under which modern day managers operate are
different from earlier corporate owners. Id. at 1. For a discussion of the question of whether
the increase in management control has affected corporate policies, see P. BLUMBERG, THE
MEGACORPORATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: THE SCOPE OF CORPORATE POWER 147-50 (1975).
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conception 4 of management responsibility to the more flexible notion of the
business judgment rule." Under the older ultra vires conception, manage-
ment's discretion was strictly circumscribed by a rigid adherence to the
corporation's charter of incorporation. Now, with the advent and general
adoption of the business judgment rule, the discretion of management is
quite broad, restricted only by the generalized duties of loyalty, good faith,
and due care.5 6
The second development concerns the goals which inform the decision-
making of management. Formerly, the dominant notion was that manage-
ment's fiduciary duty ran solely to the best interests of the shareholders.
This notion has been largely replaced by the view that management is a
fiduciary of the corporation as a whole, and as such must respond to a
broader constituency including employees, customers, government agencies,
and the public at large. 7 Recent statutes, for example, explicitly allow
directors and officers to consider the effects of corporate action on groups
other than shareholders.5"
Both of these legal developments give corporate choices a character which
more closely resembles the volition of an individual. This is because the
more flexible framework of the business judgment rule coupled with the
more inclusive fiduciary duty to the corporation itself broadens the ends or
54. The concept of ultra vires basically means that a corporation cannot act outside the
purposes for which it was formed. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 27, at 478. For a
summary of the ultra vires doctrine, noting its diminishing importance, see id. at 477-84. For
a discussion of the current state of the ultra vires doctrine and some specific criticisms of the
doctrine, see Schaeftler, Ultra Vires-Ultra Useless: The Myth of State Interest in the Ultra Vires
Acts of Business Corporations, 9 J. CORP. L. 81 (1983). It has been argued that the ultra vires
doctrine still has a use within the context of corporate takeovers. See Comment, Amalgamated
Sugar: The Auspicious Return of the Ultra Vires Doctrine, 49 Omo ST. L.J. 841 (1988).
55. The business judgment rule states that a corporate manager is not liable for an action
that is within the powers of the corporation and management's authority, and is carried out
with due care and according to applicable fiduciary duties. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra
note 27, at 661. For a brief overview of some legal and policy issues surrounding the business
judgment rule, see Manning, The Business Judgment Rule in Overview, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 615
(1984).
56. For a brief description of the shift from the ultra vires doctrine to the business judgment
rule, see L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 453-54 (1973).
57. A critical debate over the nature of management's fiduciary duty occurred between
A.A. Berle, Jr. and E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. in the 1930s. Berle defended the thesis that all powers
of corporations must be exercised only for the benefit of the shareholders. See Berle, Corporate
Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1049 (1931). Dodd contended that management
has a broader constituency and purpose than making profit for shareholders. See Dodd, For
Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HAIv. L. REV. 1145 (1932). By 1954 Berle was
willing to concede to Dodd's contention that corporate powers are held in trust not solely for
the shareholders but for the entire community. A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST
REVOLUTION 169 (1954).
58. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1721(c) (Purdon Pamphlet 1989) (corporate
directors "may" consider the effects of their actions upon employees, customers, suppliers,
and the local community).
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goals which management must evaluate in its decisionmaking. As an indi-
vidual is confronted with competing ends or goals in making moral choices, 9
so management often faces conflicting demands in its decisions regarding
the direction of the corporation. 60
While managerial discretion has expanded, shareholder powers have been
contracted. This contraction consists of an alteration of the extent and
character of shareholder control. Basically, this means that the nature of
ownership has changed with the development of the large, modern corpo-
ration.6 '
This change may be characterized as a disaggregation of the traditional
concept of ownership which may be divided into three stages: traditional
ownership, corporate ownership, and beneficiary ownership.
1. Traditional Ownership
As traditionally conceived, ownership entails control. 62 As owner of my
car, I control its use. I may take it shopping, get it washed, or even lend it
to a friend. This form of ownership may exist in small, closely-held corpo-
rations.63 When the shareholders of such corporations make the day-to-day
business decisions,64 they are owners in the traditional sense of the term.
59. The essence of a moral choice is a decision involving competing ends or goals. See
Nesteruk, supra note 14, at 464.
60. See Mason, supra note 53, at 3 (quoting the Chairman of Standard Oil on the need to
"conduct the affairs of the enterprise in such a way as to maintain an equitable and working
balance among the various directly interested groups-stockholders, employees, customers, and
the public at large").
William Smithberg, Chair and Chief Executive Officer of the Quaker Oats Company, recently
commented:
Obviously, we must answer to the shareholders-many of them institutions. I also
have responsibilities to our ... employees-many of whom are also shareholders-
to the communities in which they work, and to trade customers and the customers
who buy our products.
As managers, our job is to balance the responsibilities to all these constituencies
and treat them fairly.
William Smithburg, Address given at the Third Annual Benefit Breakfast of The Center for
Ethics and Corporate Policy (Nov. 16, 1988) (transcript available in the DePaul Law Review
office).
61. I first put forth the following analysis of the changing nature of ownership in the
corporate setting in Nesteruk, supra note 14, at 462-66.
62. In a private property system, the individual whose name is attached to the object has
the final decision over the use of that object. He determines who will use the object and in
what manner. See Waldron, What is Private Property?, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 327
(1985).
63. For a basic description of a closely-held corporation, see H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER,
supra note 27, at 694-97.
64. Harry Henn and John Alexander note that one of the distinguishing features of a
closely-held corporation is that its shareholders directly take part in the affairs and management
of the business. Id. at 696.
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2. Corporate Ownership
When the focus is on the large, publicly-held corporation, the relationship
between the shareholder and the corporate enterprise is no longer one of
traditional ownership. As Berle and Means revealed, there is a separation
of control from ownership.65 Due to widely-scattered stock ownership 66 and
proxy voting, 67 management-not the shareholders-may effectively control
the internal corporate decisionmaking process. 61 Consequently, the position
of the shareholder shifts from that of owner to that of mere investor.69 With
this development, the relationship between management and shareholders
becomes more abstract, formalized, and unidimensional. This "distancing"
between management and shareholders 70 depersonalizes the shareholder's
relation to the corporation. 7' Furthermore, the scope of a shareholder's
interaction with the corporation shifts from a range of critical perspectives
to a single demand: profit.
72
65. The owners lose control to those managing the corporation, and who hold the economic
power. The owners serve only to supply the means by which the managers can exercise that
power. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 116 (rev.
ed. 1967). Herbert Hovenkamp connects the separation of ownership from control with the
law's recognition of the corporation as a person for certain constitutional purposes. See
Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 1641.
66. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 65, at 47-65 (giving statistics on the dispersion
of stock ownership of many companies).
67. The central importance of the proxy machinery has been noted by a number of
commentators. See, e.g., J. HURST, supra note 51, at 94-95 (the proxy mechanism has become
a way in which management obtains easy access to the stockholder voting majority); R. NADER,
M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 80 (1976) (the proxy election
provides a legal means for consolidating power into the hands of the corporation's chief
executive). For a good overview of the regulatory framework and institutional background of
the proxy system, see Comment, Shareholder Democracy: A Description and Critical Analysis
of the Proxy System, 60 N.C.L. REV. 145, 145-54 (1981). The author presents a review of
criticisms and makes recommendations regarding the proxy, system's relation to shareholder
participation in the corporate electoral process. Id. at 159-64.
68. See, e.g., Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends is Corporate Management Responsi-
ble?, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 53 (E. Mason ed. 1960) (corporate decision-
making is shaped by factors such as widely scattered stock, investment trusts, and institutional
investors who consistently vote for the same managers).
69. See P. BLUMBERG, supra note 53, at 11 (discussing shift in roles from owner to investor
in corporate equity securities).
70. See Wolfe, The Modern Corporation and the Failure of Social Theory, in BUSINESS
LAW, KEY ISSUES AND CONCEPTS 41 (T. Dunfee & D. Reitzel eds. 1978) (commenting upon the
isolation of corporate decisionmakers from shareholders as well as the market and production
process).
71. This depersonalization of the shareholder's relation to the corporation can be expressed
in a number of ways. One quality that has been lost is the spiritual value of property ownership
associated with stock. Stock no longer brings satisfaction as a direct extension of the owner's
personality but serves only to generate income. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 65, at 64-
65.
72. See Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate
Social Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REV. 248, 271 (1969) (noting that for the investor the
"beginning and end of his interest in the enterprise is capital appreciation and income").
19901 PERSONS, PROPERTY, AND THE CORPORATION 555
3. Beneficiary Ownership
Despite the separation of control from ownership documented by Berle
and Means, there remains an active aspect to the shareholder's relation with
the corporation. 73 To be sure, an investor lacks direct control of the cor-
poration's internal decisionmaking process, but the investor nonetheless
exercises an external, indirect control of the corporation through the stock
market. While the investor's legal right to vote in board elections and on
extraordinary matters has little practical effect, his or her economic choice
of whether to buy or sell the corporation's stock can have a significant
impact on the decisionmaking of management. 74
In recent years, however, even the investor's indirect control through the
marketplace has diminished. This is because of the trend away from direct
individual ownership of stock and toward indirect ownership through par-
ticipation in such entities as mutual funds and pension plans." This trend
interposes the decisionmaking of large institutional actors such as banks
between the individual shareholder and the corporate enterprise. 76 In some
instances, this indirect stock ownership of individuals is involuntary as in
the case of a mandatory pension plan. 77 But even if the individual is allowed
some degree of choice regarding his or her original participation, the day-
to-day decisions to buy or sell the stock of particular companies are largely
left to professional financial managers or others. 7 Thus, to a significant
73. Berle and Means themselves noted a new forum for shareholder activity. The result of
the stockholder's loss of power within the corporation is his reliance upon an agency outside
the corporation itself-the public market. The stockholder relies upon the public market for
appraisal of his securities' value and realization of profits. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note
65, at 247.
74. For a discussion of the influence of share price and the market on management's
decisionmaking, see Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and
Means Reconsidered, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 388, 402-04 (1977).
75. Pension plans hold an enormous amount of stock in American companies. Both public
and corporate pensions as shareholders have grown in importance in the last few decades. In
fact, one author has estimated that pensions will hold enough common stock to "own" the
majority of American companies by 1990. Bavaria, Forward to CORPORATE SoCIAL RESPONSI-
BILITY: CONTEMPORARY VIEWPOINTS at ix (S. Ontiveros ed. 1986).
76. Martin Lipton argues we have reached a stage of corporate development which is
dominated by the institutional investor and professional money manager. See Lipton, supra
note 38, at 5-6.
77. At my own educational institution, for instance, a professor's participation in the TIAA-
CREF pension plan is generally mandatory once the professor reaches the age of thirty-five
and has twenty-four full-time equivalent service months of continuous service. TEACHER'S
INSURANCE AND ANNUITY AssocIATION COLLEGE RETIREMENT EQUITIEs FUND, MICHIGAN STATE
UNIVERSITY'S TIAA-CREF RETIREMENT ANNUITY PROGRAM 1988-1989, at 4-5 (available from
Michigan State University). The equity portion of the plan involves participation in the stock
market. Id. at 12-13.
78. In many pension trusts, several professionals are involved in management decisions. An
actuary determines the annual contributions, and a bank or trust company serves as trustee. In
addition, an investment consultant often renders advice and manages the assets. The employer
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degree, the individual has lost even the investor's choice of whether to buy
or sell the stock of individual companies. The shareholder's role then shifts
from that of investor to that of the beneficiary of the investing of others.
The common thread running through this disaggregation of ownership is
the shareholder's progressive loss of control over the corporation. 9 This loss
involves the diminishing significance of both the shareholder's vote in cor-
porate elections and the shareholder's investment decisions in the market.
What the transformation amounts to is a redefinition of ownership, such
that ownership no longer entails certain significant elements of control. Such
ownership without control is consistent with the notion of the corporation
as a person. It gives to the corporation a level of autonomy which approx-
imates that appropriate to the dignity and status of a person."0
C. The Corporation's Relation to its External Community
The law's recognition of the corporation as a person fosters a particular
model for the internal corporate decisionmaking process. But beyond this
impact on the corporation's internal dynamics, the normative premise of
corporate personhood tends to restrict our analytical framework for consid-
ering the corporation's relation to its external community.81 It does so because
it encourages a kind of thinking about the corporation which presupposes a
necessary relation between rights and duties.8 2 All that is necessary to bring
this presupposition into light, is to focus on contemporary theorizing about
the corporation.
The restriction corporate personhood places on considering the proper
relationship of the corporation to other segments of society has its roots in
the law's conception of personhood. A person, from the law's standpoint,
may retain some control by selecting or approving of investments recommended by the invest-
ment manager. Under a multi-employer trust fund plan, a joint union-employee trusteeship
administers the plan. A. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 92-93 (1982).
79. For another analysis of the shareholder's progressive loss of control, see Clark, The
Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REv.
561 (1981). Robert Charles Clark points to economic causes of the developments he describes.
He explains that with the increased efficiency of role specialization, there is greater concentration
of discretionary power. Likewise, an increase in participation in capital income indicates an
overall increase in wealth. Id. at 568.
80. There remain, however, crucial differences between the corporate entity and a natural
person. See Nesteruk, supra note 8, at 696-99.
81. The corporation's relation to its external community is also intertwined with language
choices generally. James Boyd White, for instance, discusses the use of the languages of
economics and of citizenship in relation to the corporation, as found in the ALI's proposed
Principles of Corporate Governance. White, How Should We Talk About Corporations? The
Languages of Economics and of Citizenship, 94 YALE L.J. 1416 (1985). White takes the position
that using both economic and philanthropic terms creates a false opposition between corporate
goals, and in fact limits corporations to those goals. Id. at 1417.
82. Gregory Mark notes the connection between corporate personhood and corporate rights.
See Mark, supra note 10, at 1443.
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is the subject of rights and duties."3 It is important to note here the dual
attribution: rights and duties. Integral to the law's definition of a person 4
is a necessary connection between the ascription of rights and the ascription
of duties.8 5
Whether or not this view of rights and duties makes sense in the context
of individuals, it should not be unthinkingly carried over to reflections upon
the corporate entity. 6 Yet this often occurs because a theorist takes as his
or her starting point the question of whether the corporation is a person.
7
A good example may be found in Michael Keeley's social contract theory
of organizations. 8 Keeley argues for a view of corporations and other
organizations which denies to such entities the status of a person. 9 He sees
organizations as merely complexes of contracts among individuals °
83. See P. POLLOCK, supra note 1, at 113 (attributing rights and duties to persons).
84. For a traditional discussion from a jurisprudential viewpoint of the various kinds of
legal persons, see J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 27-64 (1921). For a specific
discussion of corporations, see id. at 49-58.
According to Gray, a corporation which is a legal person contains three elements: (1) a
group of human beings who are acting together to promote certain interests; (2) an organized
system of operations; and, (3) legal recognition and protection by the state. Id. at 50. For
Gray, whether the law recognizes the corporation as a real person or whether this is merely a
legal fiction is irrelevant. Id. at 51-55. Under either theory, the corporation has rights and
duties. Its duties include protection of the rights of other persons, including the individual
members of the corporation. Id. at 55. Gray discussed corporate rights as the wills of individual
members attributed to the corporation. Id. at 51.
85. Rights and duties have a correlative nature. In order to have a right, there must be a
duty. On the other hand, one can have a duty without a corresponding right. Id. at 8. In order
for a duty to give rise to a right, it must require one to act or forbear. Id. In other words, a
duty that requires only an inward state of mind does not give rise to rights. Id.
86. One corporate theorist who does not unthinkingly transfer notions appropriate to natural
persons to the analysis of the corporate entity is Christopher Stone. See, e.g., C. STONE, WHERE
THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 111-18 (1975) (analogizing to
the factors of human responsibility in formulating a theory of corporate responsibility); Stone,
Corporate Regulation: The Place of Social Responsibility, in CORRIGIBLE CORPORATIONS &
UNRULY LAW 13-38 (B. Fisse & P. French eds. 1985).
87. Many of the difficulties which have arisen result from the two central meanings which
may be given to the term "person" in legal discussions. The problem was noted early on by
Alexander Nekam, who explained that in legal writings, the word "person" has at least two
different meanings. It can mean the human being as we understand it, including the physical,
psychological, and metaphysical qualities normally ascribed to humans. On the other hand, the
term "person" also has the technical meaning of the legal entity, a clearly defined concept. A.
NEKAM, supra note 9, at 49.
88. See M. KEELEY, supra note 28, at 32.
89. Central to Michael Keeley's view is the position that, under the social contract model,
organizations do not have independent personal ends or welfare. Only individuals are capable
of preferring one state of affairs to another. Welfare-entailing properties, including goals,
needs, and interests, are not the properties of organizations.ld.
90. Id.at 12 (arguing that organizations can be viewed as a set of agreements to resolve
diverse individual interests).
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Keeley concludes his theory9 by arguing that views contrary to the social
contract model "give away too much in the way of corporate rights and
gain too little in the way of corporate responsibility. '92 In so framing the
issue, however, Keeley reveals the limits of his analytic framework. Keeley
assumes the ascription of rights and the ascription of duties necessarily entail
each other. Keeley's assumption has its roots in our legal system's conception
of "person." From the law's standpoint, a person is an entity recognized
as having both rights and duties. 93 Accepting this definition as a given, Keeley
merely focuses his inquiry on whether or not organizations are persons. But
a more fundamental question might be asked: Does the ascription of duties
necessarily entail the ascription of rights?
An alternative approach would not assume a necessary connection between
rights and duties in the analysis of organizations. 94 Unlike human beings,
organizations are artificial creations, dependent in many cases (i.e. business
corporations) on the state for their very existence. 9 Neither ethics nor logic
require that the imposition of duties upon such artificial entities be accom-
panied by a bestowal of rights. 96 We are free to structure organizations in
any way which best serves society's needs. 97 This means going beyond the
question of whether or not organizations are persons. In the end, the law
needs to construct new legal categories which contemplate both the reality
of organizations as well as society's demands upon them. 98
II. A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW PARADIGM
What have been shown are the consequences which result from approach-
ing corporate law and policy from the perspective of the question of corporate
personhood. In analyzing the corporation within this framework, two con-
sequences in particular should be emphasized. First, such an approach may
91. For a review of the Keeley position, see Nesteruk, Book Review, 38 U. KAN. L. REV.
101 (reviewing M. KEELEY, A SOCIAL-CONTRACT THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONS (1988)).
92. M. KEELEY, supra note 28, at 245.
93. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1300 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). "Persons are the subject of rights
and duties; and, as a subject of a right, the person is the object of the correlative duty, and
conversely." Id.
The fifth edition of Black's defines "person" as a human being, and then lists various legal
persons, such as corporations. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1028-29 (5th ed. 1979). The word
"persona" in the fifth edition retains the language of rights and duties. Id.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 125-32 (discussing rights and duties as they apply to
humans and corporations).
95. Chief Justice Marshall eloquently described the artificial nature of the corporation. "A
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of
law." Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
96. See infra text accompanying notes 129-31 (discussing rights and duties as attributed to
human beings).
97. For one analysis of the rise of corporate actors in our society and some suggestions for
needed policy changes, see J. COLEMAN, supra note 38.
98. For one exciting approach in this direction, see M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 8.
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entail the unwitting adoption of a particular model of corporate decision-
making, one which involves a broadening of management's discretion and a
contraction of shareholder powers. 99 Even if such a model is to be favored
as a matter of public policy, its adoption should be based on an independent
and critical analysis, not an unconsidered implication of the theory of
corporate personhood. Second, approaching the issue of the corporation's
proper relation to its external community in terms of the question of cor-
porate personhood restricts our ability to think creatively and productively
about the problem. This is because the question of corporate personhood
fails to contemplate the possibility of ascribing duties to corporations, but
not rights.' °
What is required is a new paradigm 01 for thinking about the corporation,
one which transcends the person/property dichotomy of the present law. 02
What I propose is a basic tripartite structure: person, property, and organ-
ization.03 This new legal paradigm would offer advantages for the devel-
opment of both corporate law and policy. °4 Overall, it will begin to refocus
the debate in an important manner: away from concern over whether cor-
porations are persons and toward a more creative reflection upon what it is
that we want corporations to be. 05 The specific advantages of this proposed
legal framework are both its greater descriptive accuracy and its new nor-
99. See supra text accompanying notes 35-80 (discussing roles in corporate decisionmaking).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 81-97 (discussing the corporation's relationship to
the external community).
101. For the classic and enormously insightful study of the role of paradigms in scientific
development, see T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). Professor Wolfe
agrees that Thomas Kuhn's conception of "paradigms" is applicable to our policy sciences
today. Wolfe proposes that the paradigms of individualism in society and the methodology
used to analyze our economy are irrelevant to the current group-dominated society. Wolfe,
Power in the American Economy: A Review and Commentary, 27 AM. Bus. L.J. 131, 151-52
(1989).
102. According to Thomas Kuhn, paradigms tend to maintain their status. Once a scientific
theory has achieved the designation of a paradigm, it will be replaced only when an alternative
paradigm is available. T. KUHN, supra note 101, at 77.
103. To avoid confusion here, I should make clear that the category of organization which
I propose would also include collectives other than the corporation. For present purposes,
however, I focus simply on the corporation.
104. Thomas Kuhn emphasizes how a new paradigm changes the inquiry in its subject area.
Paradigms are based on both nature and science. They provide the pertinent scientific community
with methods and solutions to resolve issues in that area. Because of this, development of a
new paradigm often requires a redefinition of the underlying science. T. KUHN, supra note 101,
at 102.
105. The importance of this refocusing lies in the manner in which it emphasizes and reaffirms
the need for individuals to make choices regarding the structure and character of corporations.
Mere reflection upon the question of corporate personhood too easily leads to an orientation
which regards the corporate entity as primarily an independent external reality. But the form
which modern corporations take should be the result of conscious human choices, both on the
individual and collective level.
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mative orientation. °6 The proposed paradigm is more descriptively accurate
in that it does not require ignoring or distorting the character of the large
corporation so that it may comport with more traditional legal concepts.
Neither the notions of "person" nor "property" adequately describe the
reality of today's corporation. 07 The new normative orientation of the
proposed paradigm arises from the manner in which it facilitates a consid-
eration of the corporation free from association with the traditional notion
of a natural person. 08 This new approach will not allow the norms, values,
and assumptions relating to individuals to be unthinkingly transferred to an
analysis of the corporation. These two advantages are discussed more fully
below.
A. Descriptive Accuracy
Descriptive accuracy is a prerequisite to sound thinking about the corpo-
ration. Concepts which are ill-fitted to the reality of a phenomenon distort
our perception of that phenomenon and hide or obscure a number of its
important attributes.' 9 A particular virtue of this new framework is its
potential for bringing squarely into view what has been obscured by the
traditional person/property paradigm: the phenomenon of corporate power. 0
To see why this is so, it is necessary to consider the nature of power itself.
This may be accomplished by drawing upon the work of John Kenneth
Galbraith. I"'
According to Galbraith, the sources of power are three: personality,
property, and organization." 2 These three sources of power correlate with
106. Michael Keeley notes this dual aspect of organizational theory. Organizational theory
is made up of two aspects: the empirical, or how a phenomena can be explained; and the
normative, or what needs to be explained. M. KEELEY, supra note 28, at 10.
107. Describing the corporation in terms of the person/property paradigm leads to anomalous
results. Thomas Kuhn notes, "Anomaly appears only against the background provided by the
paradigm." T. KUHN, supra note 101, at 65. It is the anomaly which leads to the emergence
of a new paradigm.
108. A further intriguing possibility is that the law also requires a new model for our
understanding of natural persons. Although the idea can not be fully explored here, it may be
that the law's conceptualization of the corporation as a person is in part rooted in a diminished
or distorted view of the nature of human beings. For a fruitful inquiry challenging some central
and prevalent assumptions about individuals, see A. ETZIONI, THE MORAL DimENsioN: TOWARD
A NEW ECONOMICs (1988) (discussing the prevailing neoclassical paradigm used to understand
individuals and exploring an emerging deontological paradigm).
109. This includes concepts which form our social policy tools of law and economics. See
Wolfe, supra note 101, at 133 (arguing that law and economics incorrectly view both people
and large corporations as "individuals").
110. According to Art Wolfe, power is associated with institutional size. The size of a
company gives rise to certain perceptions, beliefs, and patterns of thought and behavior. Large
institutions, particularly the business corporation, give rise to these beliefs and behavior, which
ultimately shape our environment to suit the institutions' needs. Id. at 132.
111. J. GALBRAITH, THE ANATOMY OF POWER (1983).
112. Id. at 6-8.
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the three central concepts of the proposed paradigm. Because the law's
traditional scheme forced a choice between either "person" or "property,"
the organizational character of the corporation was effaced. Along with this
distortion of the corporate character, an important aspect of corporate power
was obscured. That aspect is the power which arises from the corporation's
status as an organization.
The obscuration of the organizational nature of corporate power is of
great significance, because a mark of our social development is the growing
prominence of the organization as a source of power. Since the preeminent
sources of power have shifted away from personality and property and
toward the organization," 3 the law's traditional scheme of person versus
property fails to capture the modern matrix of power. Such a failure can
only hinder proper analysis and inhibit the law's development.
In particular, the traditional scheme fails to make explicit the manner in
which the organization can be used to overcome the inherent limitations
which flow from personality as a source of power. For example, there are
time limitations upon the length of a human life, but not upon the duration
of a corporate existence. Galbraith notes this as an important aspect of the
modern corporation. In contrast, personality as a source of power is subject
to the limits of the human life span. Accordingly, various entities have
overcome the weakness of this source of power through organizational power.
These entities include the church, the chartered company, and now the
corporation. '4
Beyond the growing importance of organizational power in our lives, it is
necessary to consider the different instruments of power which are available.
There are, says Galbraith, three fundamental instruments of power: condign
power, compensatory power, and conditioned power." 5 Condign power and
compensatory power are respectively the powers to punish and reward. An
example of condign power available to the corporation is its ability to fire
an employee. The corporation's compensatory power is shown by the award-
ing of a raise to a worker. Conditioned power, on the other hand, constitutes
a more subtle and less perceptible form of influence." 6 Conditioned power
goes beyond merely channeling an individual's desires toward a corporate
purpose through external punishments and rewards. Rather, it is the ability
to influence the very nature of a person's desires; it is the power to effect
the formation and thus alter the intrinsic character of individual prefer-
ences." 7 A prominent example of conditioned power is the ability of the
113. The most recent significant movement in the dynamics of power is the development of
the organization as a source of power. At the same time, there has been a decline in the
comparative roles of personality and property. Id. at 131.
114. Id. at 104-05.
115. Id. at 4-6.
116. For a more extensive discussion of conditioned power, see id. at 24-37.
117. Those submitting to conditioned power prefer to accept authority and submit to the
will of others. Id. at 24.
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corporation to alter consumer preferences through a sophisticated advertising
campaign."'
Each of these three instruments of power has a natural affiliation with
one of the three sources of power. The instrument of power particularly
associated with the organization is conditioned power, as developed from
social conditioning. l l9 Thus, with the increasing influence of organizational
power, there is an increasing use of conditioned power. Not surprisingly,
the movement in society is away from condign physical enforcement and
compensatory pecuniary reward, toward a reliance on the use of conditioned
power. 120
The increased use of conditioned power again points to the need for a
new legal paradigm. Part of what is distinctive about conditioned power is
the subtle and imperceptible form of its influence. This by itself suggests
the need for a legal framework which serves to bring into view the dynamics
of such power. However, the object of conditioned power is of greater
importance here. By definition, conditioned power seeks to alter our desires.
In doing so, it strikes at the core of much of our legal system in that, unlike
systems drawn primarily from natural law or idealist traditions, the predom-
inant theory of our legal order is rooted in individual preferences.' 2 ' Our
announced aim is to facilitate and accommodate human desires. 122 As large,
modern corporations become increasingly adept at altering such desires, we
face the paradox of a creature of the law becoming its creator. Only with a
legal paradigm which enables us to see the phenomena before us clearly, can
we hope to respond effectively to such a paradox. 2 1
B. Normative Orientation
As greater descriptive accuracy will allow us to reveal more fully the
phenomenon of corporate power, so a new normative orientation will enable
us to fashion appropriate legal strategies regarding such power. The prior
118. I have previously explored how the structure of the market may affect the formation
of shareholder preferences. See Nesteruk, supra note 14, at 462.
119. J. GALBRAITH, supra note 11l, at 61.
120. Id. at 23.
121. A central tenet of our jurisprudence is that general values and legal goals are to be
derived from prevailing wants and interests. See Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in
Twentieth Century American Legal Thought-A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant
General Theory About Law and its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 861, 875-80 (1981).
122. Roscoe Pound spoke of the end of the law in the following way: "We mean such an
adjustment of relations and ordering of conduct as will make the goods of existence, the means
of satisfying human claims to have things and to do things, go round as far as possible with
the least friction and waste." R. POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THOUGH LAW 65 (1942).
123. The belief in the importance of one's individual worth can distort our perception of
society as a whole. This distortion is apparent in the failure to recognize that collective social
action is different from individual action. This perception of the importance of individualism
is furthered by the fact that large corporations are using the language of individualism to justify
their actions. See Wolfe, supra note 101, at 155.
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analysis of the corporate person question suggests a review in two key
respects. First, there is a need to consider alternatives to the current model
of internal corporate decisionmaking. 24 Second, the assumed necessary con-
nection between rights and duties should be reevaluated.1 21
The new normative orientation of the proposed legal paradigm will foster
the active consideration of alternative corporate decisionmaking models. The
model which emphasizes the expansion of managerial discretion and the
contraction of shareholder powers has its roots in the notion of the corpo-
ration as person. Reconceptualizing the corporation as an organization allows
for an unhindered exploration of alternatives.
The current model of corporate decisionmaking has been subject to much
criticism. Calls for reform range from a more active, monitoring board of
directors, 126 to tapping the power of institutional shareholders.1 27 The im-
mediate point here is not to advocate one reform proposal over another.
Rather, it is to assert that the proposed tripartite legal framework with its
separate category of organization allows for a new normative perspective.
Such a perspective makes possible an independent review of alternative
decisionmaking models free from the norms, values, and assumptions we
associate with the concept of a natural person. The starting point for such
evaluation thus shifts from the metaphysical question of corporate person-
hood to the phenomenon of corporate power.
The proposed paradigm also facilitates the reevaluation of the assumed
necessary connection between the ascription of rights and duties. Freed from
the assumptions embedded in the legal definition of a person, the issue may
be considered in a new light. One may now ask whether the nature of the
corporate entity calls for such a connection at all.' 28
The necessary connection between rights and duties makes sense only if
the subjects which one contemplates are human beings within a community
of human beings. Within such a setting, the interconnection can be defended
on both ethical and logical grounds. Its ethical justification lies in the natural
status of individuals as free, moral agents.' 29 The ascription of duties without
124. See supra text accompanying notes 51-80 (discussing factors affecting corporate deci-
sionmaking).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 81-86 (discussing the corporation's relationship with
the community).
126. A number of possibilities in this direction are reviewed by Christian Meier-Schatz in a
look at corporate governance problems from a transnational perspective. In particular, the
author discusses management monitoring systems. See Meier-Schatz, Corporate Governance and
Legal Rules: A Transnational Look at Concepts and Problems of Internal Management Control,
13 J. CoRP. L. 431 (1988).
127. See Lipton, supra note 38 at 52-69 (discussing changes in derivative action procedure
and principles of shareholder democracy in corporate governance).
128. For a short but insightful discussion of the status of organizations and organizational
rights, see McDonald, The Personless Paradigm, 37 U. TORONTO L.J. 212 (1987).
129. For a discussion of evidence for the view that moral commitments effect the behavior
of individuals, see A. ETZIONI, supra note 108, at 51-66. The author provides evidence that
people's acts are at times motivated by altruism, as opposed to self-interest. Id.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
rights would violate this status in that it constitutes a prescription for
slavery.130 There is also an important logical aspect to the connection of
rights and duties. Rights and duties have a correlative nature; that is, the
right of one implies the duty of another.13" ' Given the premise of equality in
a community of only human beings, all persons must therefore have rights
and duties if any one person is to possess them.
Corporations, however, lack the natural status of the individual as a free,
moral agent.1 2 As the corporation is an artificial entity,'33 its character is
subject to the choices we collectively make as a society. Since the corpora-
tion's status as a free, moral agent may not be assumed, neither can the
interconnection of rights and duties which flows from such status. Moreover,
in a community of corporate and individual actors, there need no longer be
the premise of equality among community members. Thus, rights and duties
can exist without all laying claim to them.
What this analysis provides is a theoretical justification for taking a new
approach toward corporations. The law's ascription of duties to the corporate
entity need not entail the ascription of rights. While such a stance would be
objectionable if applied to individuals, it appears quite appropriate in the
case of corporations.
The potential of this new theoretical position may be illustrated by making
brief reference to the landmark case of First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti. '14 In Bellotti, the Supreme Court considered the issue of corporate
first amendment rights in the context of a political referendum. Focusing
not on the corporate speaker, but rather on corporate speech,'3 5 the Court
held in favor of corporate first amendment rights. a6 What the new theoretical
position suggested herein would do is create a framework for a critique of
Bellotti's result. One could now argue that we may impose legal duties on
the corporation without granting to the corporation the corresponding con-
stitutional right to participate in the political debate which is the source of
such duties. This is because the assumed connection between such a consti-
tutional right to participate in the creation of laws and the responsibility to
obey them does not exist in the case of corporations.
130. See J. GAY, supra note 84, at 27 ("One who has rights but not duties, or who has
duties but no rights, is, I suppose, a person. An instance which would commonly be given of
the former is the King of England; of the latter, a slave.").
131. See P. POLLOCK, supra note I, at 61-65 (discussing the correlation between rights and
duties).
132. For a discussion of corporate moral agency in a legal context, see Nesteruk, supra note
8, at 687-99.
133. Accepting the artificial nature of the corporation need not include an emphasis on the
corporation's status as a state-created entity. A corporation is artificial in that it is a human
creation subject to human choices.
134. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). For an introduction to the scholarly literature on Bellotti, see supra
note 8.
135. See Nesteruk, supra note 8, at 686 (discussing corporate speech and moral issues).
136. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795.
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III. CONCLUSION
The large, modern corporation does not fit neatly into the conceptional
framework of the present law. What I have proposed is a new paradigm:
person, property, and organization. This new paradigm possesses greater
descriptive accuracy than that which exists under the present law. Its partic-
ular virtue is the manner in which it brings into view the phenomenon of
corporate power. Beyond its greater descriptive power, the proposed para-
digm adopts a new normative orientation for the law. This new orientation
will prevent the norms, values, and assumptions relating to natural persons
from being unthinkingly transferred to the analysis of the corporation. Such
a normative stance will foster a more creative reflection regarding the
corporation. Moreover, it will make possible an unhindered exploration of
alternatives regarding both the corporation's internal decisionmaking process
and its relation to the external community.

